This paper proposes a speci…cation test of the mixed logit models, by generalizing Hausman and McFadden's (1984) test. We generalize the test even further by considering a model developed by Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) .
Introduction
Multinomial choice models have become an important model in demand estimation. The model can parsimoniously characterize the demand system by allowing the number of parameters to be substantially smaller than the number of products. In this literature, it is a common practice to adopt a mixed logit speci…cation, probably for the purpose of relaxing the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) properties. However, the IIA property still holds at the individual level.
A model speci…cation which relaxes the individual IIA assumption is formulated and estimated by Burda, Harding and Hausman (2008) .
The logit speci…cation, despite such limitations, provides much computational convenience, which naturally prompts for a speci…cation test. A speci…cation test for the multinomial logit model was addressed by Hausman and McFadden (1984) , who proposed a variation of the Hausman (1978) test. We note that the speci…cation test does not exist for mixed logit models.
It has been recognized for many years that an important problem with the multinomial logit model is the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) property. The IIA property implies that the ratio of the probabilities of choosing any two alternatives is independent of the attributes of any 1 other alternative in the choice set. Debreu (1960) gave an early discussion about the implausibility of the IIA assumption. Models that have the IIA property do not allow for di¤erent degrees of substitution or complementarity among the choices. 1 Indeed, Hausman (1975) demonstrate that IIA requires all cross-price elasticities for a given product are identical, a seemingly implausible assumption for di¤erentiated product demand models.
An early justi…cation for use of the multinomial logit model with the IIA property was that when estimated on individual data, aggregate predictions did not have the IIA property. The Hausman-McFadden (1984) test allowed for a test of the underlying foundational IIA assumption.
No known property was demonstrated in the literature that if the IIA property did not hold at the individual level, it "cancelled out" at the aggregate level in terms of estimating the correct price elasticities. More recently, models which allowed heterogenous preferences have become widely used.
Again, as we demonstrate in this paper and has been recognized, many heterogenous preference models impose IIA at the individual level. Again, claims have been made that when used at the aggregate level that the IIA assumption has only limited relevance. We explore those claims in this paper and provide a speci…cation test that allow for a determination whether use of the IIA property at the individual level leads to inconsistent estimates at the aggregate level, when the IIA property does not hold true.
Thus, the purpose of this paper is to …ll the gap in the literature by developing a generalization of the Hausman and McFadden's (1984) speci…cation test. We consider two variants of the test.
In the …rst case, we consider the usual mixed logit model where the logit model parameters are assumed to be random coe¢ cients independent of the explanatory variables. As in Hausman and McFadden (1984) , we consider estimating the model coe¢ cients after removing an alternative from the choice set, and comparing the new parameter estimates with the original estimates. Since the mixed logit model assumes IIA at the individual level, the speci…cation test should have good power properties. In the second case, we consider the variant of the mixed logit model considered 1 In the literature, this property is often called the "red bus-blue bus"problem. 
Mixed Logit Model
In this section, we consider a typical mixed logit choice model, and develop a speci…cation test in the spirit of Hausman and McFadden (1984) . We compare two parameter estimates. The …rst one is the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) for the original model. The second one is the MLE for the implied model where we remove an alternative from the choice set. The removal of an alternative produces a sample selection problem, which we control by using Bayes theorem. The resultant likelihood for the restricted model turns out to be very intuitive. Because the original MLE is the e¢ cient estimator, the comparison of the two estimates validates the straightforward formula as derived in Hausman (1978) .
We start with a standard model where the individual utility takes the form 
We assume that i;j are independent and identically distributed extreme value random variables.
The i is the random coe¢ cient which allows for deviation from the textbook logit model. We assume that the i are i.i.d. with distribution f ( j ) parameterized by some . Typically, we assume that it is drawn from a multivariate normal distribution, although we leave f ( j ) as an arbitrary distribution throughout the theory part of the paper. Some of the components of i may be allowed to be nonrandom. Indeed, by allowing f ( j ) to be a mixture distribution, a very ‡exible distribution can be used as discussed in e.g. Burda, Harding and Hausman (2008) .
We can easily see that the model above nests the typical model used in demand estimation
where P j is price and x j are non-price product characteristics. For simplicity, we assume that the 
where d ij denotes the binary indicator that takes the value 1 if the ith individual chooses the jth alternative. Here, the notation C denotes the original choice set. Now, if we remove the third alternative, the IIA implies that
where C R denotes the restricted choice set that removes the third alternative. The Hausman and
McFadden (1984) test compares the MLE for the full sample using the speci…cation (3), and the MLE for the subsample with y i3 = 0 using the speci…cation (4). The IIA assumption of the logit model follows from equations (3) and (4), where the ratios of the probabilities for d i1 = 1 and d i2 = 1 are the same in both equations.
We now consider a generalization of this idea to the mixed logit model. In this context, developing the likelihood for the subsample requires controlling for selection. For this purpose, consider removing the "outside good"in the example (2) . Individuals who choose the outside good have preferences that are di¤erent from individuals who don't choose the outside good. In the current setting, individuals who have weak preferences for the two non-price characteristics (i.e., individuals with low or negative ) are most likely to choose the outside good. Therefore, if we remove the outside good from the choice set and estimate the model using only individuals who didn't chose the outside good, the parameter estimates will overstate the individuals'willingness to pay for non-price characteristics. The selection problem arises from the presence of random coe¢ cients f ( j ).
We now consider removing the last alternative in the mixed logit speci…cation (1). For simplicity, we will assume that J = 3. For individuals with i , the probabilities that the three options are chosen are given by
4 and the (unconditional) likelihood is the integrated version with respect to f ( j ), i.e.,
Note that the IIA holds at the individual level in equation (5) . We consider removing the last alternative, with the restricted choice set C R consisting of j = 1; 2. Note that
where Pr C R i denotes the probability that the restrictive choice set C R is chosen. The IIA implies that
It follows that
where f j C R ; denotes the conditional density of for the subsample of individuals that chose the alternatives in C R . By Bayes rule, we have
where we write
Combining (6), (8) and (9), we obtain
5 Likewise, we obtain
It is straightforward to show that the result generalizes in a straightforward manner to the case with arbitrary J and C R . In order to characterize the likelihoods, it is convenient to de…ne a random variable y i = 1 if d ij = 1. Also, let z i = 1 if the agent i chooses an option in C R , and 0 otherwise. Then the MLE b 1 based on the full sample solves
where P (j; ) is de…ned in (6) . The MLE b 2 based on the subsample after certain choices are removed solves
Under correct speci…cation and standard regularity conditions, we can see that both estimator are consistent and asymptotically normal, and their asymptotic variances can be consistently estimated by 2
and 2
Because b 1 is e¢ cient relative to b 2 , the Hausman test statistic takes the usual form.
Comparison of (10) and (11) does indeed make a natural generalization of Hausman and McFadden (1984) , which can be understood by considering a simple case without any random coe¢ cient, i.e., the case where i = . If so, we obtain
Therefore, the counterpart of (11) indeed re ‡ects the IIA (4). 6 
Extension to BLP
In this section, we generalize the idea developed in Section 2 to deal with the complications in BLP. We develop counterparts of b 1 and b 2 , and discuss how they can be compared. We will call b 1 and b 2 the …rst and second step estimators.
Characterization of b 1
Characterization of the …rst step estimator is relatively straightforward, because it only requires description of the BLP model. We do need to be a little bit careful in describing the asymptotic framework. The BLP typically starts with the utility We start with the utility
where i;j is i.i.d. extreme value distribution j = 1; : : : ; J. The market share s j is then
where w denotes the collection of x's and p's, and the f ( j ) denotes the density of = ( ; ) indexed by . It is assumed that there is an instrument such that 2 E [z j ] = 0; j = 1; : : : ; J:
Using the contraction mapping discussed in BLP, we can write
where s 0 denotes the vector of shares in the population. Letting F denote the distribution of , we may write the moment restriction E zg j s 0 ; w; F = 0; j = 1; : : : ; J
based on which we can estimate .
3 2 In BLP, the instrument is in fact a function H j (z) of the conditioning variable z, where z is from the conditional moment restriction E [ j j z] = 0. We avoid notational complication by working with the instrument z j itself. 3 Here, the s 0 denotes the true vector of shares, but in practice we use the estimated vector of shares s n instead.
The di¤erence does not result in di¤erent asymptotic distribution as long as n; T ! 1 at an appropriate rate, which can be shown by a textbook-level analysis. See Appendix B.
In order to understand the moment (18) in a convenient asymptotic framework, we use intermarket variation and work with E z t g j s 0 t ; w t ; F = 0 ; j = 1; : : : ; J; t = 1; : : : ; T (19) for j;t = g j (s 0 t ; w t ; F ). In terms of asymptotics, we assume that J is …xed while T ! 1. 4 This approach leads to the characterization of the …rst step estimator to be the solution to the sample counterpart 5 of the (18) in the following form:
Here, the z j;t denotes an arbitrary transformation of z t .
Characterization of b 2
We now consider implementation of the second step, and consider estimation of after removing an alternative. Roughly speaking, the implementation of the second step consists of the following:
First, we de…ne the restricted choice set C R as before. We note that by Bayes rule, this approach is equivalent to using
as the density of , instead of f ( ). Let F R denote such a distribution. Note that the F R in fact depends on w t , so it should in principle indexed by t as well, although we suppress it here for notational simplicity.
With the restricted choice set, we need to rede…ne the vector of market shares s R t . For simplicity, we assume that the …rst J 1 alternatives constitute the restricted choice set, and the last J J 1 alternatives are removed. The s R t is then the J 1 -dimensional vector which is obtained by choosing the …rst J 1 elements of s 0 t and dividing each of them by the sum of the J 1 elements. For example, suppose that there are four choices in the original choice set, i.e., s 0 t is a four-dimensional vector. Suppose that the last choice had a market share equal to 20%. Suppose that C R consists of the …rst three choices. Then s R t is a three-dimensional vector obtained by dividing the …rst three 4 Our asymptotics re ‡ects Berry and Haile's (2014) result. See Appendix A. 5 Here z j;t corresponds to H j (z) T (z j ) in BLP (p. 857). 6 The rest is identical to the …rst step.
We now provide the details of implementation. We recognize two features that distinguishes the current models of the BLP framework. First, the discussion in the previous section makes it clear that the second step requires the counterpart of g j in (18) be based on the conditional the conditional density of for the subsample of individuals that chose the alternatives in C R .
Second, we have additional in each market, which is …xed in a given market and plays a role of a parameter in each market. Therefore, implementation of (21) requires careful re-examination of our steps in the previous section.
In order not to complicate notations unnecessarily, we proceed as before and only consider the simple case J = 3, where we remove the third alternative. Writing
we obtain the counterparts of (6) and (7) P t (j; ; t ; w t ) Pr (d ijt = 1j ; t ; w t ) = Z exp ( 0 w j;t + j;t ) exp ( 0 w 1;t + 1;t ) + exp ( 0 w 2;t + 2;t ) + exp ( 0 w 3;t + 3;t )
and Pr C R i ; t ; w t = exp ( 0 w 1;t + 1;t ) + exp ( 0 w 2;t + 2;t ) exp ( 0 w 1;t + 1;t ) + exp ( 0 w 2;t + 2;t ) + exp ( 0 w 3;t + 3;t ) :
We note that the IIA at the individual level implies that
and likewise
where f j ; t ; w t ; C R denotes the conditional density of for the subsample of individuals that chose the alternatives in C R . By Bayes rule, we have
where Pr C R ; t ; w t = exp ( 0 w 1;t + 1;t ) + exp ( 0 w 2;t + 2;t ) exp ( 0 w 1;t + 1;t ) + exp ( 0 w 2;t + 2;t ) + exp ( 0 w 3;t + 3;t ) ;
Comparison of (15) with (24) reveals a potential complication for the second step. In (15), the distribution of only depends on , whereas it depends on ( ; t ; w t ) in (24). This implies that we need to …x the value of ( t ; w t ) in addition to when the inversion ("contraction mapping") between s R t and ( 1;t ; 2;t ) is performed for the subsample after the third alternative is removed. The second step in the speci…cation test needs to address such a dual role played by the 's. For this purpose, we will emphasize the dual role of the 's and rewrite 8 (24)
t ;
(2)
An intuitive idea to overcome the potential complication due to the dual role of the 's is to use the 's computed from the full set of alternatives (i.e., before removing any alternative) as (1) t . This approach implies that the second step estimator b 2 may need to be based on the following complicated steps:
1. For a given candidate value of , use the inversion (17) for the full set of alternatives, and compute t ( ; s 0 t ; w t ) g (s 0 t ; w t ; F ) and let
(1) t = t ( ; s 0 ; w t ) in (27). 8 We adopted the normalization J;t = 0 earlier, i.e.,
J;t = 0. We note that there are only J 1 choices left after J J 1 alternatives are removed. This implies that in the second step, there are J 1 such j;t 's. Therefore, the normalization should now take the form that J1;t = 0 in the second step. The two di¤erent normalization can be written 
t ; w t ; C R denote the result of the inversion applied to the restricted set of choices, we may then proceed with GMM adopting the moment restriction (16).
Although this idea is intuitive, it may appear to be complicated for practical implementation.
We argue that the algorithm in fact simpli…es quite a bit, and the speci…cation test requires only one "contraction mapping". It turns out that in the second step, we can work with the moment
where J 1 denotes the last alternative in the restricted choice set C R . See Section 3.3 for details.
Remark 1
We also note that the number of moment equations is smaller than when the full set of choices were considered. For example, when J = 3 (and impose the normalization that t;3 = 0), the full choice set gives us two moments E [z t t;1 ] = 0 and E [z t t;2 ] = 0, whereas the restricted choice set after removing the third alternative gives us one moment E [z t ( t;1 t;2 )] = 0.
This implies that we can use a GMM estimator that solves
wherez j;t denotes an arbitrary transformation of z t , which is in general di¤erent from z j;t in (20). 
Some Details behind (28)
We explain that the J 1 components of (2) j;t is equal to the …rst J 1 components of (1) j;t subtracted by (1) 
The subtraction is just for the purpose of normalization, so we prove this property by establishing that the second contraction mapping problem can be solved by choosing
t , where~
(1) t consists of the …rst J 1 components of (1) t . As in the previous section, we simplify notations by assuming that J = 3 and that the last alternative is removed, although the analysis can be easily extended to the case with arbitrary J and J 1 .
For a given value of , we have t;j = g j (s 0 t ; w t ; f ( j )) in (17), i.e., the 's in the full sample, are computed such that if we let t;j = g j (s 0 t ; w t ; f ( j )) in (22), it would exactly coincide with the jth component of s 0 t;j :
This implies that if we let t;j = g j (s 0 t ; w t ; f ( j )) in (26), it would be exactly equal to the population share of C R in the sample, i.e.,
Using (24), and (25), we can write
t ; 
1;t +exp 0 w 2;t +
2;t +exp 0 w 3;t +
(1)
in (33), we obtain
t ;~
t ; w t ; C R = R exp 0 w 1;t + 
(1) 
t ; w t ) is one-to-one 9 , and we conclude that the
is the only value (up to normalization) such that
Therefore, we conclude that 
Monte Carlo Simulations
We now present Monte Carlo simulation results of our speci…cation tests. Our Monte Carlo design is motivated by the concern that logit speci…cation has the well-known IIA property. See
Hausman and Wise (1978), e.g., for detailed analyses of the limitations of the IIA Property as well as discussion of the alternative probit speci…cation that overcomes the problem. See also Burda, Harding, and Hausman (2008) for further development of the alternative speci…cation.
These simulations con…rm our mixed logit speci…cation tests have attractive size and power properties. The tests reliably identify misspeci…cation in the mixed logit model when it exists. 9 Note that the density of remains positive everywhere even after application of Bayes rule in (25), so Berry's (1994) su¢ cient condition for the existence of the inverse mapping is satis…ed.
13
When there is no misspeci…cation, type I errors occur infrequently. Below, we …rst describe simulations of the mixed logit speci…cation test in section 2. Then, we describe simulation results based on the generalization of the test in section 3.
Monte Carlo Simulations of Mixed Logit Model
The Mixed Logit model described in section 2 estimates demand using individual consumers' observed choices. Our Monte Carlo simulations of this model are set up as follows. Each simulated consumer i makes choices from three choice sets that each have three options. One of the three options is an outside good for which utility is normalized to zero. Each remaining option j has an associated price (P j ) and two non-price characteristics (x j1 and x j2 ). 10 We simulate choices for 500, 1000, 1500, or 2000 consumers.
11
Consumers'simulated choices maximize their utility, which takes the same form as in equation (2) above. Preferences for non-price characteristics are drawn from a normal distribution and preferences for price are assumed equal for all simulated consumers. The …rst column of Table 1 reports the parameter estimates we obtain when we estimate the mixed logit using 100 sets of simulated data, each with 2000 consumers. Column (1) reports the parameter values used to generate the data. Column (2) reports the mean maximum likelihood estimates when we estimate the original mixed logit model and there is no misspeci…cation ( b 1 ). Column (3) reports 10 In practice, price is a randomly drawn integer between $1 and $10. Non-price characteristics are randomly drawn from a uniform distribution. 11 Choice sets are allowed to vary across individuals. With 2000 consumers, for example, one simulated dataset is comprised of 6000 independently drawn choice sets (three for each consumer) that include three options each. 12 Speci…cally, the omitted characteristic a¤ecting utility takes the form ! ij P j , where ! ij is drawn from a uniform distribution.
14 the mean maximum likelihood estimates when we use the same simulated data as in column (2) but remove the outside good from the model and base estimation only on those consumers never choosing the outside option. If the model is properly speci…ed, the estimated coe¢ cients should be very similar under these two scenarios. Columns (4) and (5) are analogous to columns (2) and (3) except these sets of parameter estimates are based on misspeci…ed data with endogenous prices.
The results presented in Table 1 Table 2 reports on the size and power properties of the mixed logit speci…cation test. The table reports results from testing two null hypotheses. First, we test the null hypothesis that all parameters (3 parameters determine mean preferences and 2 determine heterogeneity) are equal across the original model and the modi…ed model without an outside good. Second, we test the null hypothesis that only the 3 mean parameters are equal across the two models. 14 Columns
(1) and (2) report how frequently the properly speci…ed model is rejected at the 5% level across 13 In other words, after restricting the choice set under misspeci…cation, the estimated preferences for x 1 change from N (1:691; 1:498) to N (1:549; 1:096).
14 We include this test as an option for practitioners since it is often a challenge to precisely estimate the parameters that determine preference heterogeneity.
the 100 simulated data sets. Columns (3) and (4) report how frequently the misspeci…ed model is rejected at the 5% level. We calculate our test statistics using three di¤erent estimates of the variance matrix. The top panel of table 2 reports test statistics that use the outer product of gradients (i.e., BHHH) as in equation (12) above. Table 2 con…rms the mixed logit speci…cation test has desirable power properties. When the mixed logit model is properly speci…ed, we observe type I errors infrequently. When the simulated data includes 1000 consumers and we base our test statistics on the BHHH variance matrix, we reject the null hypothesis that all of the parameter estimates (the means only) are the same across the two models in 10% (8%) of simulations. When the sample size increases to 2000 consumers, these rejection rates are 8% and 8%. When there is misspeci…cation, the null hypothesis is frequently rejected, especially with large samples. With the BHHH variance matrix and simulated data with 1000 consumers, we reject the null hypothesis that all of the parameter estimates (the means only) are the same across the two models in 82% (89%) of simulations. With 2000 consumers, the null hypotheses are rejected in nearly 100% of simulations. Table 2 also reports the test's power properties using alternative estimators of the covariance matrices used in the speci…cation tests. The middle panel reports test statistics using the Hessian.
The bottom panel of table 2 reports test statistics that are based on a non-parametric estimator of the variance matrix. 15 The size and power of the speci…cation test are very similar when using BHHH or Hessians to calculate the variance matrix. The speci…cation test has a slightly smaller size and slightly more power using non-parametric estimates of the variance matrix.
Monte Carlo Simulations of BLP
The Monte Carlo simulations of the BLP speci…cation test described in section 3 are set up like those for the mixed logit speci…cation test except the simulated data sets are market shares (instead of individuals'simulated choices) that re ‡ect product level error terms (e.g., j ).
16 15 We construct this estimate using the observed distribution of estimated parameters across the 100 simulations. 16 Although the BLP model is estimated using aggregated market shares, the BLP speci…cation still relies on a model of individual choice that exhibits the IIA property. Therefore, any counter-factual policy analysis based on BLP is predicated on the behavior of individual consumers who are constrained by the IIA property. Such an implicit constraint may lead to an incorrect analysis of a hypothetical merger that may result in disappearance As before, simulated consumers make choices from choice sets that have three options. Consumers in market m in period t choose between an outside good whose utility is normalized to zero and two inside goods. Each inside option j in mt has an associated price (P mtj ), two nonprice characteristics (x mtj1 and x mtj2 ) that are observable to the econometrician and one non-price characteristic ( mtj ) that we do not observe. Products'observable characteristics (x and P ) are drawn from the same distributions as described above and the product level error terms ( ) are drawn from a normal distribution. 17 We assume that within each market and time period, mt, all consumers face the same choice sets but we allow P and x to vary across time periods t within the same market m. While we do allow to vary across time within the same market, 18 the estimation algorithm assumes that jm does not vary across time periods. This restriction facilitates estimation and also introduces an error into the estimation routine that is the source of variation across simulations.
19
Within each market and time period, a continuum of consumers maximize their utility, which takes the same form as the utility function in equation (14). 20 When we apply the speci…cation test to a properly speci…ed model, the error terms in consumers' utility ( ) are drawn from an extreme value logit distribution. When we apply the speci…cation test to a misspeci…ed model, these errors are correlated across products within the same choice set (i.e., under misspeci…cation, the IIA property is violated at the individual level).
21
We simulate data for 20, 30, 40, or 50 markets, and assume that consumers within each of certain products from the market, for example. Our speci…cation test is developed to detect such a potential problem in the data that may distort the counter-factual analysis. In particular, our Monte Carlo design re ‡ects the spirit of the alternative probit speci…cation in Hausman and Wise (1978) . 17 Price (P mtj ) is a randomly drawn integer between $1 and $10. Non-price characteristics (x mtj1 and x mtj2 ) are randomly drawn from a uniform distribution. 18 Speci…cally, we assume jmt = jm + ' jmt , where ' jmt is a "shock"to product j's jm that varies across time. 19 This restriction facilitates estimation because after we control for jm using the Berry contraction mapping, the only remaining source of variation in shares in market m across time periods is variation in X mt and P mt . Since the estimation routine controls for jm but not ' jmt , draws of ' jmt will a¤ect the resulting parameter estimates. 20 As above, preferences for non-price characteristics (x) are drawn from a normal distribution. All consumers are assumed to have the same preferences over price and . 21 Speci…cally, the error term that consumer i receives for product j in mt is the sum of an extreme value logit error and normally distributed error term. These latter errors are positively correlated for the outside good and the least expensive inside good.
market make choices in 10 distinct time periods. When there are 50 markets, for example, one simulated dataset includes 500 market shares (50 markets 10 periods) for the outside good and each of the two inside goods. After simulating each dataset, we use the full choice set and the unconditional simulated markets shares (s mt1 ; s mt2 ; s mt3 ) to estimate 1 using weighted nonlinear least squares. 22 We then compare these estimated parameters to the estimates we obtain (i.e., 1 ) using a restricted choice set and the conditional market shares
, where s mt1 is the share of the outside good) and nonlinear least squares. 23 We perform this exercise 1000 times.
Across the 1000 simulations, variation in the parameter estimates is driven by variation in the portion of mj that varies with time. properly speci…ed data, the mean parameter estimates in columns 2 and 3 are close to the true parameter values in column 1, regardless of whether we estimate BLP using the full choice set (i.e., 1 ) or a choice set that excludes the outside good ( 2 ). However, when BLP is misspeci…ed, the parameter estimates are biased and depend on whether the model was applied to the full choice set or restricted choice set. We condition on the estimates of for product 3 using b 1 because the model no longer includes an outside good.
Therefore, we must normalize for product 3 to the value estimated when using the full choice set.
frequency of Type 1 errors ranges from 6 percent to 8 percent depending on the number of markets we simulate data for. 24 For example, when the simulate data includes 60 markets, we reject the null hypothesis in only 8 percent of simulations. When the BLP model is misspeci…ed, the speci…cation test frequently rejects the null hypothesis of no misspeci…cation. Column 3 displays these failure rates when all of the coe¢ cients are tested. When we simulate data using only 20 markets, the misspeci…ed BLP model fails the speci…cation test in 59 percent of simulations. When we use 50 or 60 markets, these failure rates increase to 82 percent and 92 percent. with respect to the …rst argument such that the derivatives are bounded in absolute value by G (w t ; F ); (ii) E jz j;t j G (w t ; F ) < 1; and (iii) T = o (n), where n = min n t and n t denotes the number of individuals in each market t. 25 In other words, under some mild regularity conditions, we get the same asymptotic distribution as when we use the true market share s 0 t . 25 The third assumption is useful because we have s Notes:
[2] The mis-specified model assumes a positive correlation between the error term and price.
Properly Specified Model

Misspecified Model
True Parameter [1] Notes: [2] Null hypothesis of no misspecification tested at the 5 percent level.
[3] The simulated data includes 10 observations of each market. 
